Do we have free will?
Zu einer Position springen (3)
Worum es bei dieser Frage geht
Every choice you make has causes: your genes, your upbringing, what you ate for breakfast, the state of your neurons a second ago. If all of that was already fixed, could you ever have chosen otherwise, and does it matter whether you could?
Philosophers split three ways. Compatibilists say free will is acting on your own reasons without coercion, which a fully caused world allows. Libertarians say real choice needs something not fixed in advance. Skeptics say neither works, so free will as most people picture it doesn't exist. The answer bears on blame, punishment and whether pride or regret make sense.
Positionen
3 Positionen, ohne Rangfolge. Öffne eine für die ganze Argumentation.
Free will means acting on your own reasons and values without being forced, even if those reasons themselves have causes (compatibilism).
2 Begründungen1 Quelle2 Einwände aus anderen Positionen
What we care about when we call a choice free is whether it came from your own reasons rather than a gun to your head.
Stärkster Einwand (Lässt etwas weg), aus Sicht von No, free will is an illusion: Your reasons came from genes and experiences you never chose.
At the moment of choosing, more than one future is genuinely open, and the person, not prior causes, settles which one happens (libertarian free will).
2 Begründungen0 Quellen2 Einwände aus anderen Positionen
When you deliberate, you experience more than one option as genuinely open.
Stärkster Einwand (Folgt nicht daraus), aus Sicht von No, free will is an illusion: Feeling free is exactly what we'd expect if we simply can't see the causes of our own decisions.
Our choices are the product of causes we didn't choose, so nobody could have done otherwise and nobody deserves blame or praise in the deep sense.
2 Begründungen2 Quellen3 Einwände aus anderen Positionen
Brain activity that leads to a movement starts before people feel they have decided, so the feeling of choosing comes after the brain has already set things in motion.
Stärkster Einwand (Übertrieben), aus Sicht von Yes, our choices aren't fixed in advance: The early buildup may just be random neural noise, not a hidden decision.
Wo stehst du?
Welche Position kommt deiner Sicht am nächsten? Auch „noch unentschieden“ ist eine gute Antwort, und du kannst sie jederzeit ändern.
Offene Fragen
Hier braucht diese Seite noch Hilfe. Jede Aufgabe dauert nur ein paar Minuten.
5 offene Fragen anzeigenOffene Fragen ausblenden
- Quelle hinzufügen
Quelle angefragt · No, free will is an illusion
Flicking a wrist at a random moment isn't the kind of choice anyone argues about.
- Quelle hinzufügen
Noch keine Quelle · Yes, our choices aren't fixed in advance
When you deliberate, you experience more than one option as genuinely open.
- Quelle hinzufügen
Noch keine Quelle · Yes, free will fits a caused world
Holding people responsible works: praise, blame and punishment change how people act, and that only makes sense if their choices respond to reasons.
- Quelle hinzufügen
Noch keine Quelle · No, free will is an illusion
Every event, including a decision, is either caused by earlier events or happens by chance.
- Quelle hinzufügen
Noch keine Quelle · Yes, our choices aren't fixed in advance
Physics no longer says the future is fully fixed: quantum events appear to be genuinely random, so determinism may simply be false.
Fehlt eine Position?
Position vorschlagenQuellen
- PhilPapers Survey 2020: results for all respondentssurvey2020.philpeople.org
- Wikipedia: Neuroscience of free willen.wikipedia.org
- Schurger, Sitt & Dehaene (2012): An accumulator model for spontaneous neural activity prior to self-initiated movement, PNAS 109(42)digitalcommons.chapman.edu
Mehr aus Ethik und Philosophie
Meistgelesen und am besten recherchiert
- Meistgelesen · 13 QuellenShould veganism be more widely adopted?
- Am besten recherchiert · 16 QuellenShould cities restrict new AI data centers?
Melde dich an, um eine Position vorzuschlagen, Belege beizusteuern oder einer Schwachstelle zu widersprechen.